The Portland Trail Blazers Finally Have Their Offense. Now They Have To Make It Work
The Portland Trail Blazers enter the 2026-27 season with a very different offensive outlook from the team that finished last season. Portland went 42-40 and reached the playoffs, but the postseason exposed a problem that became difficult to ignore. The Trail Blazers could generate plenty of offense during the regular season, yet their production fell sharply when San Antonio took away their preferred options.
Portland averaged 115.5 points per game during the regular season while posting a 113.1 Offensive Rating, a 53.4% effective field goal percentage and a 57.0% true shooting percentage. Against San Antonio, those numbers fell to 100.0 points per game, a 102.2 Offensive Rating, a 46.8% effective field goal percentage and a 50.8% true shooting percentage.
The interesting part was what did not happen. Portland's turnovers actually declined from 17.3 per game during the regular season to 12.8 in the playoffs. The issue was not simply that the offense became careless. Portland struggled to create efficient opportunities once San Antonio took away the actions that had worked during the regular season.
The offseason addressed that weakness directly. Ja Morant gives Portland another elite downhill creator, while Damian Lillard's return gives the team another high-level shooter and offensive playmaker. The pieces are now available. The next question is whether Portland can actually make the offense work.
Portland's Offense Was Better Than The Playoff Series Suggested
It would be easy to look at the San Antonio series and conclude that Portland simply had a bad offense. The full regular season tells a different story.
The Trail Blazers averaged 115.5 points per game while producing 48.3 points in the paint, 46.0 rebounds and 14.1 offensive rebounds per game. They also played at a 101.63 pace. Portland was capable of generating offense through multiple areas of the floor, particularly its ability to attack the paint, create second chances and play quickly.
The problem was consistency. Portland had several games in which the offense produced enormous numbers. They scored 137 points, 135 points, 134 points, 132 points, 131 points and 130 points during the season. They also had several games in which the offense nearly disappeared, scoring 93, 94, 95, 97, 98 and 99 points.
That volatility matters. A team can survive inconsistent three-point shooting during the regular season if it can create points in the paint, generate offensive rebounds and force opponents to defend in transition. Portland did many of those things well enough to win 42 games.
The playoffs are different. When an opponent has time to prepare for the same team over multiple games, the ability to create a new advantage becomes much more important. That was where Portland struggled.
San Antonio Exposed The Biggest Weakness
The numbers from the playoff series are striking. Portland's scoring dropped from 115.5 points per game to 100.0. Its Offensive Rating fell from 113.1 to 102.2. Effective field goal percentage declined from 53.4% to 46.8%, while true shooting percentage fell from 57.0% to 50.8%.
Those numbers show that Portland wasn't simply missing a few extra shots. The quality and efficiency of the team's offense changed.
At the same time, turnovers fell from 17.3 to 12.8 per game. Portland was actually protecting the ball better. That distinction is important because it points toward the type of offensive improvement the team needed.
Portland didn't simply need to become more careful. It needed another way to create advantages when the defense took away the first option. That is where Ja Morant becomes particularly interesting.
Ja Morant Gives Portland Another Level Of Creation
Morant arrives in Portland after a difficult 2025-26 season. He played only 20 games and averaged 19.5 points and 8.1 assists while shooting 41.0% from the field and 23.5% from three.
Those numbers are well below the level he established earlier in his career. Morant averaged 27.4 points and 6.7 assists in 2021-22. He followed that with 26.2 points and 8.1 assists in 2022-23, then averaged 25.1 points and 8.1 assists in 2023-24. Even in 2024-25, he averaged 23.2 points and 7.3 assists.
Portland is therefore making a bet on a return toward that previous level. There were still flashes during last season. Morant scored 35 against New Orleans, 28 against Phoenix and 40 against Philadelphia. He also recorded 24 points and 13 assists against Orlando and 23 points and 12 assists against Atlanta. His 40-point performance against Philadelphia came on 16-of-22 shooting.
The most important part of his game for Portland may be his ability to create for others. Morant averaged 8.1 assists despite playing only 20 games. He recorded eight games with at least 10 assists and eight double-doubles during that stretch.
That matters because Portland's playoff problem was largely about what happened when its preferred offense stopped working. Morant can get downhill, force help and create a defensive rotation. He can turn one defender's decision into a problem for the entire defense. That gives Portland something it struggled to consistently produce against San Antonio.
The Shooting Question Still Matters
There is an obvious concern with adding Morant. He has never been a particularly reliable three-point shooter. His career three-point percentage is 31.1%, and he shot only 23.5% from three last season. His 2025-26 effective field goal percentage was 44.1%, well below the roughly 50% to 53% range he had produced during several previous seasons.
Portland therefore cannot simply surround Morant with more players who need the ball or struggle to space the floor. This is where Damian Lillard becomes so important.
Lillard shot 37.6% from three during his previous healthy season while averaging nearly 25 points and seven assists. His return gives Portland a player who can provide offensive creation while also forcing defenses to respect the perimeter.
That creates an intriguing relationship between the two guards. Morant can attack the paint. Lillard can stretch the defense. Morant can attack a defense that is worried about Lillard's shooting. Lillard can initiate offense while Morant works against a defense that has already been forced to move.
The theoretical fit is much more interesting than simply asking whether Morant can improve his three-point shooting.
Damian Lillard Changes The Geometry
Lillard's return is difficult to evaluate because of his age and his Achilles injury. He will be 36 years old when he returns, and Portland cannot reasonably expect the version of Lillard who carried enormous offensive workloads earlier in his career.
The previous healthy season still provides an encouraging baseline. Nearly 25 points per game, nearly seven assists and 37.6% three-point shooting would give Portland a major offensive weapon even if his role becomes more selective.
Portland does not need Lillard to control every possession. He can operate as a secondary creator, space the floor, close games and provide another reliable source of offense when Morant is being pressured.
That could also help preserve Morant's effectiveness. If Morant has to create everything, defenses can focus their attention on him. If Lillard is standing on the floor as a legitimate shooting threat, the defense has another problem to solve.
That is the basic appeal of the pairing. The challenge is whether the defensive limitations of the pairing outweigh the offensive advantages.
Deni Avdija Could Make The Offense More Complete
Deni Avdija is another major reason to believe Portland's offense could look different next season. Avdija averaged 24.2 points, 6.9 rebounds and 6.7 assists during the 2025-26 season while shooting 46.2% from the field. His 31.6% Assist Percentage showed how much responsibility he carried as a creator.
That role became more difficult during the playoffs. Against San Antonio, Avdija averaged 22.2 points, 6.0 rebounds and 4.6 assists while shooting 44.9% from the field and posting a 56.2% true shooting percentage.
He remained Portland's leading scorer, but the series showed how difficult it was for the offense when too much responsibility fell on him.
Morant and Lillard can change that. Avdija can still score, but he may not need to create every advantage himself. He can receive the ball after Morant collapses the defense. He can attack closeouts. He can initiate transition. He can find shooters when defenses rotate toward him.
His 6.7 assists per game could become even more valuable if Portland has more high-level scoring threats around him. That could allow Avdija to remain one of Portland's most important offensive players without requiring him to carry the entire half-court offense.
Jrue Holiday Gives Portland Another Option
Jrue Holiday adds another layer to the offense. He averaged 16.3 points, 6.1 assists and 4.6 rebounds while shooting 37.8% from three. His 30.2% Assist Percentage and 2.21 assist-to-turnover ratio also demonstrate his ability to create without dominating possessions.
Holiday gives Portland another player who can initiate offense, make the extra pass and space the floor. His presence becomes especially useful when considering the amount of attention Morant and Lillard will receive.
A possession does not necessarily have to begin with Morant or Lillard. Holiday can initiate, move the ball and allow Portland's primary creators to attack later in the possession.
That kind of flexibility could become important over an 82-game season. It also gives Portland another option when opposing defenses begin overloading toward Morant.
Portland Does Not Need To Become A Three-Point Machine
Portland shot only 34.3% from three last season, which naturally creates questions about the team's shooting. The addition of Lillard helps address that concern, but the larger offensive goal should be broader than simply taking more threes.
Portland already demonstrated an ability to generate points inside. The team averaged 48.3 points in the paint and 14.1 offensive rebounds per game. Its 101.63 pace also allowed the team to generate opportunities before opposing defenses could fully establish themselves.
The next step is creating better offensive options when those advantages disappear. Morant can provide downhill pressure. Lillard can provide shooting gravity. Avdija can attack advantages and facilitate. Holiday can initiate secondary actions.
That gives Portland several different ways to create a quality possession. The offense does not have to depend on one player beating his defender every time.
The Offense Still Has A Problem To Solve
There is a temptation to look at the additions of Morant and Lillard and assume Portland's offensive problems have been solved.
That would be premature. Morant's efficiency has to recover. His 41.0% field goal percentage and 23.5% three-point shooting from last season cannot become the new normal if Portland wants this experiment to work.
Lillard has to return from an Achilles injury at an age when physical limitations become increasingly important. Avdija has to adjust to sharing creation responsibilities with multiple high-level guards. Holiday has to find a role that provides value without making Portland's guard rotation even more crowded.
And the team still needs enough shooting around these players to prevent defenses from shrinking the floor. Those are significant questions. The difference is that Portland now has more ways to answer them.
The Real Test Will Come In The Playoffs
The regular season should provide plenty of opportunities for Portland to figure out its new offensive identity. The team already knows what happens when the offense works. Last season produced 115.5 points per game, 113.1 Offensive Rating and enough interior production to help Portland win 42 games.
The bigger question is what happens when an opponent has a week to study the offense and starts taking away its favorite actions. That is where last season's playoff series becomes so important.
Portland's offense dropped from 115.5 to 100.0 points per game against San Antonio. Its effective field goal percentage fell from 53.4% to 46.8%, and its true shooting percentage dropped from 57.0% to 50.8%.
Those numbers provide the clearest argument for why the organization pursued additional creation. Morant gives Portland another player capable of generating an advantage when the possession breaks down. Lillard gives the team another elite shooting threat. Avdija provides a large playmaking forward who can connect actions. Holiday gives the team another experienced secondary creator. The talent is there. The question is whether the offense can become organized enough to use it.
Portland Has To Turn Creation Into An Identity
The Trail Blazers enter the 2026-27 season with considerably more offensive talent than they had when last season began. That alone should make the team more difficult to defend. The bigger challenge will be deciding what the offense actually wants to become.
Portland can play through Morant and use his ability to attack the paint. It can use Lillard's shooting to stretch the floor. It can allow Avdija to operate as a connector and secondary creator. Holiday can initiate possessions and keep the ball moving.
The best version of this offense should make it difficult for opponents to take everything away. That was the problem Portland encountered against San Antonio. Once the Spurs disrupted the preferred actions, the Trail Blazers struggled to generate efficient alternatives. The offseason has given Portland more answers.
Now the coaching staff has to put those answers together. The Trail Blazers may have entered the offseason needing another offensive creator. They now have several. The next step is turning that collection of scoring and playmaking talent into an offense that can survive the pressure of the postseason. If Portland can do that, the 42-win team from last season could look considerably different when the games matter most.
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